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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The Petitioner Maxfield has filed for a Writ of
Certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
the judgment of the trial court.

The decision of the Court of

Appeals was rendered August 23, 1989. The sole issue presented
to the Supreme Court is whether the Petitioner's brief raises the
appropriate considerations governing review of certiorari by the
Utah State Supreme Court.

The governing law in determining this

question are the provisions of Rule 4 3 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

Rule 4 3 provides:

(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same
issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a
way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court as to call for an exercise of this
court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this court.
Statement of Facts
This action arises out of a dispute between Reed
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Maxfield and Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife, with
respect to the title and right of possession of two parcels of
real estate located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
Maxfield filed his original Complaint on October 20,
1980, simply alleging that he was the fee title owner of the property and entitled to possession.

Rushtons filed a Third-party

Complaint joining the State of Utah as a third-party defendant to
the action.
On or about December 10, 1984, Maxfield filed a motion
to file a second amended complaint including causes of action for
fraud and punitive damages despite the fact that the trial date
had been set for January 10, 1985, only one month from the date of
filing of said motion.

Shortly thereafter, in December 1984,

Maxfield filed a petition in bankruptcy under a Chapter 11
proceeding.

Subsequently, the judge in the Bankruptcy Court per-

mitted the lawsuit to be heard in the Third Judicial District
Court.
On June 1, 1987, the trial judge, after hearing oral
argument from the parties, set a scheduling order which included
the first place trial setting of September 15, 1987.

On August

10, 1987, counsel for Maxfield filed a motion to continue the
trial date.

The motion was denied on August 17, 1987. On August

11, 1987, Maxfield filed a motion to dismiss all claims by any of
the parties against the plaintiff.
On August 19, 1987, the plaintiff Maxfield then filed a
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third amended complaint raising entirely new issues including a
civil rights cause of action.

At the pretrial hearing on August

31, 1987, with all parties present, counsel for Maxfield moved
that he be allowed to withdraw.

At that time, the court heard

arguments from all the parties including the plaintiff Maxfield
himself.

The court, after hearing all the arguments from the

parties, dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action for failure to
prosecute.
The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the file, was very
much aware of the fact that the defendants had filed three
requests for trial settings and had obtained four trial settings
and that plaintiff Maxfield continually opposed all of the
defendants' or court's efforts to have the matter proceed in a
judicious manner for trial.

The plaintiff appealed from the judg-

ment dismissing his cause of action and raised the following
issues in his brief:
1. The District Court erred in refusing to
grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Page 10 of Appellant's Brief.)
2. As a matter of law, the execution and sale
of real property of record in plaintiff by State
of Utah for satisfaction of third-party judgment
was improper and plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment should have been granted. (Page 13 of
Appellant's Brief.)
3. The court erred in failing to grant an
order allowing redemption of the real property.
(Page 14 of Appellant's Brief.)
4. The court erred in entering an order of
dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint for failure
to prosecute. (Page 16 of Appellant's Brief.)
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In the Petition filed by the Appellant for a Writ of
Certiorari, the following specific questions are presented for
review:
1. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff1s
case when the plaintiff was ready, willing and able to
proceed.
2. The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals written by
Judge Garff confirmed the action of the trial court.

In

particular, Judge Garff stated on page 3:
The trial court dismissed Maxfield's cause of
action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, for his "failure to timely prosecute the case."
Such a dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication upon the merits of the case.

The court on page 4 of its

opinion states:
After a thorough review of the record, we find
that Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the
case. After he filed his complaint on October 20,
1980, he amended it twice and attempted to amend
it yet a third time, each time adding additional
theories of the case. He moved three times for
summary judgment: the first time on March 11,
1981, prior to joinder of the State; the second
time on May 30, 1984; and the third time on June
19, 1984, when he neglected to give adequate
notice of the hearing to opposing counsel. He
filed an interlocutory appeal in 1981, appealing
the trial court's refusal to grant his first
motion for summary judgment, which the supreme
court declined to hear . . . Further, on three
occasions trial dates were set, he objected to the
trial settings on the grounds that he wished to
amend his complaint, that he was involved in the
bankruptcy proceeding, and that his new counsel
had inadequate preparation time. During the
course of the action, he retained three different
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attorneys, two of whom withdrew from the case
because of his failure to pay them. He filed no
certificates of readiness for trial and, despite
his protests as to insufficient discovery time, no
motions for the taking of depositions.
Judge Orme, in a concurring opinion, states on page 8:
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute
is usually not appropriate except when it follows
a substantial period of complete inactivity. It
would be an extraordinary case where such a dismissal would be appropriate with trial scheduled
in just a few days, especially following a flurry
of motion activity. While the question is a
closer one for me than the main opinion may
suggest, I am persuaded this is that extraordinary
case.
It is evident that the Court of Appeals was familiar
with all the issues that were raised on appeal and are now raised
by this Writ of Certiorari—and specifically addressed them.
ARGUMENT
I
THE PETITIONER, BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI, HAS
REPEATED THE SAME ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND
HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUES AS DEFINED BY RULE 43
OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
Unless otherwise provided for in tl^e constitution or
statutory form, certiorari is not a writ of right in most cases.
Its issuance rests upon the sound discretion of the court to which
the petition is made.

Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).

The Petition will not be granted and the Writ will not be issued
on the mere suggestion of the party that there is an error in the
record.

The pleading seeking relief by way of certiorari must

specifically designate the jurisdictional excesses or abuse of
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discretion claimed and are subject to being dismissed if they
merely set forth a conclusion.

Lee v. Provo City Civil Service

Commission, 582 P.2d 485 (Utah 1978).

The Utah Court in Rohwer

v. District Court, 125 P. 671 (Utah 1912) has indicated that a
special case must be shown for the court to exercise its discretion in issuing a common law writ of certiorari.

Therefore, the

writ of certiorari is to be used sparingly.
Rule 4 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court is very
specific in setting forth the considerations which shall govern
the court's review of certiorari.

The Court of Appeals must have

rendered a decision which is in direct conflict with the decision
of another panel of the Court of Appeals.

The panel of the Court

of Appeals must have decided a question of state or federal law in
such a manner that it is in conflict with the Utah Supreme Court.
Third, a panel of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which
radically departs from the usual course of judicial proceeding.
Fourth, the Court of Appeals decided an important question of
municipal, state or federal law which has not been but should be
settled by the Utah State Supreme Court.
In reviewing these considerations, it is obvious that
the only possible consideration that could be raised as an appropriate consideration is number 3 which should require that the
Court of Appeals issue a decision which is extreme and did constitute an abuse of discretion in arriving at its decision.
Clearly, the decision of the Court of Appeals demon-
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strated that the Court of Appeals fully understood all of the
facts in the case and thereafter applied the appropriate law as
set forth in the decision of this court.

In particular, the

appropriate law was applied from the rulings in Brasher Motor and
Finance Company v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (Utah
(1969); Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen
Contractor Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); K.L.C. Incorporated
v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982).

In Maxfield v. Fishier, 538

P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial
court justifiably dismissed the plaintiff's case because she had
been dilatory in responding to the defendant's efforts of
discovery, had resisted attempts made by the defendant to get the
case to trial, was not ready to proceed at the time of the trial
date because of inexcusable neglect, and had no justification for
continuance as required by Utah Rules of Civijl Procedure 41(b).
Not only did the Court of Appeals understand clearly the
history of this case, it applied the law in a fair and even-handed
manner.

There certainly was no abuse of any discretion.
Petitioner, by filing for writ of certiorari, not only

fails to raise any issue as required under the four considerations
as set forth in Rule 43, said petitioner simply repeats the same
issues raised on appeal. With respect to the first question
raised for review, counsel for the petitioner in his brief
states:
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs
case when plaintiff was ready willing and able to
proceed. The dismissal coming in a pre-trial con-
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ference a mere 15 days prior to trial date.
Evidently the District court became irritated and
frustrated with counsel for Plaintiff who indicated he wanted to withdraw at that point.
This argument is an unsupported emotional request for
undeserved assistance from the Supreme Court.

It also represents

a serious misrepresentation of the actual facts as they are
related in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
With respect to the second issue raised in the Petition
for Writ for Certiorari, the Petitioner states:
Early in the chronological history of this
case the plaintiff moved the district court for
summary judgment based on pleadings and
affidavits . . . The Honorable Judge Sawaya denied
the motion for summary judgment and an
interlocuatory appeal was filed with the Supreme
Court . . . Plaintiff believes that the ruling
denying the Motion for Summary Judgment by Judge
Sawaya was in error and should have been granted.
* * *

. . . The Utah Court of Appeals either did not
consider the argument or if so, overlooked
entirely the point in its opinion.
The foregoing statement is in direct conflict with the
opinion of the Court of Appeals which on numerous occasions refers
to Appellant's motions for summary judgment and the reasons for
the denial thereof.

Again, it is amply clear that the court was

not only familiar with the requests and motions for summary judgment but declared that the failure to prosecute is a more overriding issue and that the case was justifiably dismissed.
The Petition has not raised any appropriate considera-

_Q_

tion upon which the Supreme Court of Utah can grant the Writ of
Certiorari.
II
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN RENDERING ITS DECISION.
The primary issue presented to the dourt of Appeals on
appeal was whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the
plaintifffs Complaint under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

With respect to the standard to be followed by the

courts in determining whether or not a complaint should be dismissed under Rule 41(b), the case of K.L.C Incorporated v. Ron
McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982) reiterates the five basic factors
to be considered by the court in similar casek:
1.

The conduct of both parties;

2.

The opportunity each had to move the case forward;

3.

What each of the parties has dofte to move the case
forward;

4.

What difficulty or prejudice ma^ have been caused
to the other side;

5.

And most important, whether injustice may result
from the dismissal.

The Court of Appeals1 opinion addresses this very
standard.

Judge Garff on page 4 of the Decision states:

A court's discretion, however, must be balanced
against higher priority; to "afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them."
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company, 544 P.2d at 879.
Thus, there is more to consider in determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper than merely
the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed.
Id. The factors which we consider may include the
following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward;

-9-

(3) what each of the parties has done to move the case
forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have been
caused to the other side; and (5) most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
After a thorough review of the record, we find that
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was one based on
sound reasoning, fairness, justice, and after due consideration.
CONCLUSION
The Respondents Rushton respectfully submit that the
Petition has not presented any issue that can or should legally
support the granting of a Writ of Certiorari.

The Petition

itself is an emotional repetition of the same arguments that have
been made for more than nine years.

As Judge Orme stated in his

concurring opinion:
The system had been burdened long enough.
Dismissal for failure to timely prosecute was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jf

day of October, 1989.

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

f^fA}^

BV

Hertry'S. Mgaard
Attorney ror Respondents,
Owen and Carol Rushton
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

7/ day of October, 1989, I

caused to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, four true and
correct copies of the Respondents Rushtons1 Brief in Opposition to
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari from Decision of Utah
Court of Appeals Dated August 23, 1989, to the following counsel:
Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
350 South 400 East
Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Appellant
Paul VanDam, Esq.
Attorney General
Stephen G. Schwendiman, Esq.
Bernard M. Tanner, Esq.
Leonard E. McGee, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
Tax and Business General
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorneys for State of Utah

irfr^ SJ' Nygaard
Attorney for Defendants/
Respondents Rushton
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FILED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Reed Maxfield,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

"•yc
Ct#rk of t>* Court
OPINION
(For Publication)

Ute* Court • ! Appttlt

v.
Case No. 880332-CA
Owen A. Rushton and Carol
Rushton, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.
Owen A. Rushton and Carol
Rushton, his wife,
Third-Party Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

v.
State of Utah, by and through
Utah State Department of
Social Services,
Third-Party Defendants and
Co-Respondents.

Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Lorin N. Pace, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for Respondents;
David L. Wilkinson, Stephen G. Schwendiman, Bernard
M. Tanner, Leonard E. McGee, Salt Lake City, for
Third-Party Defendants.

Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff and appellant, Reed Maxfield, appeals the trial
court's dismissal of his action against defendants and
respondents, Owen A/ and Carol Rushton, and the State of Utah,
for failure to prosecute. We affirm the trial court's
dismissal of his action.
We recite only those facts pertinent to disposition of this
appeal.
APPENDIX A, PAGE 2.

Mazfield initially filed his complaint in this action on
October 20, 1980, alleging that the Rushtons had wrongfully
deprived him of his property by purchasing it through an
illegal sheriff's sale. The Rushtons filed their answer and
counterclaim on April 1, 1981, along with a third-party
complaint against the State of Utah, requesting reimbursement
of the purchase price for the property if the court should find
in Mazfield's favor. On April 14, 1981, the State answered the
Rushtons' third-party complaint and filed a third-party
complaint against Mazfield.
From October 20, 1980 until December 14, 1984, various
motions were filed by the parties, primarily by Mazfield,
resulting in obfuscation of the issues and protracted delay.
Two additional factors contributed to the delay: an eighteen
month interruption while the Rushtons were on a mission for
their church, and a bankruptcy filing by Mazfield.
The case remained in limbo for nearly two years as a result
of Mazfield's bankruptcy. Finally, on November 18, 1986, the
Rushtons filed a certificate of readiness for trial. Ten days
later, Mazfield objected to setting the case for trial because
he wished to amend his complaint by adding further claims
against the State, his discovery was incomplete, his bankruptcy
stay was presently effective, and his new attorney needed time
to familiarize himself with the case. Despite Mazfield's
objections, on February 20, 1987, the bankruptcy court ordered
that the case could be heard in district court. Thereupon, the
State filed for an immediate trial setting.
On March 4, 1987, Mazfield's counsel withdrew because
Mazfield had failed to pay him. On March 20, 1987, the
Rushtons gave Mazfield notice to obtain substitute counsel and,
again, moved for an immediate trial setting. A hearing was
scheduled on this motion for June 1, 1987. On May 18, 1987,
Mazfield filed a pro s& objection to the trial setting on the
grounds that he was incapable of handling the case himself and
that he was in the process of seeking new counsel.
At the June 1 hearing, the court set trial for September
15, 1987, and scheduled a pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987.
All discovery was to be completed prior to August 17, 1987.
On August 10, 1987, the State certified to the court that
it had complied with Mazfield's discovery requests, answered
Mazfield's proposed second amended complaint, and moved for

APPENDIX A, PAGE 3 .
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summary judgment against Maxfield. Maxfield filed a motion to
dismiss all claims by other parties against him because of his
discharge in bankruptcy and filed an objection to the trial
setting, requesting a two month continuance on the grounds that
his new counsel had scheduling problems and that he intended to
file a third amended complaint. The court scheduled a hearing
on the State's motion for summary judgment for August 24, 1987.
Between August 11 and 17, 1987, the parties filed more
miscellaneous motions. On August 17, 1987, the court denied
Maxfield•s motion to continue the trial date or to extend
discovery time. Thereafter, Maxfield filed a response to the
State's motion for summary judgment, alleging insufficient
discovery time, and filed his third amended complaint, which
set forth a new conspiracy theory between the Rushtons and the
State.
On August 20, 1987, the State submitted a list of expected
witnesses and a certificate of compliance with Maxfield9s
discovery requests. The following day, it objected to
Maxfieldvs third amended complaint. The Rushtons filed a
similar objection. The trial court heard all the parties'
motions on August 24, 1987, denying Maxfield's motion to file a
third amended complaint and also the State's motion for summary
judgment.
At the pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987, the trial court
again denied the parties* prior motions. Maxfield's new
attorney moved to withdraw as counsel. The court denied
counsel's motion to withdraw, and ordered that Maxfield's
action be dismissed for failure to timely prosecute. Maxfield
subsequently appealed this order.
On appeal, Maxfield argues that the trial court erred in:
(1) dismissing his action for failure to prosecute; (2)
refusing to grant summary judgment in his favor; and (3)
refusing either to void the sheriff's sale, thereby quieting
title in his favor, or to grant him the immediate right to
redeem the properties.
The trial court dismissed Maxfield's cause of action,
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
for his "failure to timely prosecute the case."1 Such a
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), in part, states that "[flor failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against him."

APPENDIX A, PAGE 4.

dismissal, under Rule 41(b), "operates as an adjudication upon
the merits" of the case.
It is well established that the trial court may, on its own
motion, dismiss an action for want of prosecution under Rule
41(b). Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 23 Utah 2d 247, 461
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure
Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This
authority is an "inherent power,' governed not by rule or
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases." Charlie Brown Constr. Co..
740 P.2d at 1370 (quoting Link Y. Wabash R, CO., 370 U.S. 626,
630-31 (1962)). Therefore, the trial court has "a reasonable
latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute
if a party fails to move forward according to the rules and the
directions of the court, without justifiable excuse."
Westinohouse Elec. S U P P I V C O . V . Paul W. Larsen Contractor
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975) (footnote omitted).
Consequently, a lower court's dismissal of a case under Rule
41(b) will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from
the record that it has abused its discretion. Wilson v.
LambALfc, 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980); Department of Social
Servs. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980); Reliance
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Caine. 555 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1976);
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson. 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528,
529 (1973).
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a
higher priority: to "afford disputants an opportunity to be
heard and to do justice between them." Westinohouse Elec.
Supply Co.. 544 P.2d at 879. Thus, there is more to consider
in determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is
proper than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit
was filed. Ifl. The factors which we consider may include the
following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3)
what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4)
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other
side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from
the dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah
1982); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah
1977).
After a thorough review of the record, we find that
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case. After he filed
his complaint on October 20, 1980, he amended it twice and
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attempted to amend it yet a third time, each time adding
additional theories of the case. He moved three times for
summary judgment: the first time on March 11, 1981, prior to
joinder of the State; the second time on May 30, 1984; and the
third time on June 19, 1984, when he neglected to give adequate
notice of the hearing to opposing counsel. He filed an
interlocutory appeal in 1981, appealing the trial court's
refusal to grant his first motion for summary judgment, which
the supreme court declined to hear. He then filed a number of
miscellaneous, primarily self-serving motions over the course
of the proceedings, none of which served to move the case
forward, but were, instead, apparent attempts to circumvent the
denial of his motions for summary judgment. He further delayed
prosecution of the case for nearly two years by filing for
bankruptcy on December 10, 1984, shortly before the case was to
come to trial. During this bankruptcy action, he assigned his
interest in the disputed property, which was his major asset,
to a corporation which he allegedly owned and controlled as the
primary shareholder. Further, on the three occasions trial
dates were set, he objected to the trial settings on the
grounds that he wished to amend his complaint, that he was
involved in the bankruptcy proceeding, and that his new counsel
had inadequate preparation time. During the course of the
action, he retained three different attorneys, two of whom
withdrew from the case because of his failure to pay them. He
filed no certificates of readiness for trial and, despite his
protests as to insufficient discovery time, no motions for the
taking of depositions.
Although the Rushtons did not answer Maxfieldfs complaint
for approximately six and one-half months after it was
initially filed, the rest of their conduct and that of the
State generally served to move the case along. Together, the
Rushtons and the State filed four motions indicating their
readiness for trial, one of which was filed almost immediately
after the Rushtons returned from their mission. The record
indicates that they actively pursued discovery, including the
taking of depositions, and certified twice that they had
complied with Maxfield9s discovery requests. In contrast, they
had to file motions twice to compel Maxfield to comply with
their discovery requests.
In evaluating the relevant factors, we find, first, that
Maxfield9s conduct in prosecuting the case was dilatory while
defendants9 overall conduct served to move the case along.
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Second, although both parties were unable at tiroes to move
the case forward, Mazfield's behavior was more dilatory.
Mazfield was unable to prosecute the case while the Rushtons
served their eighteen month mission. However, once the
Rushtons returned, they almost immediately notified the court
that they were ready to proceed to trial. Similarly,
defendants were unable to prosecute the case during the
pendency of Mazfield's twenty-two month bankruptcy action.
Unlike the Rushtons, however, Mazfield did not voluntarily
inform the court that his bankruptcy action was completed and
the case could move forward in district court, but, instead,
objected to trial settings and waited for the State to petition
the bankruptcy court for permission to proceed with the action.
Third, despite his prodigious number of motions, little or
nothing that Mazfield did after filing his initial complaint
served to move the case along, while virtually everything that
defendants did after the Rushtons returned home from their
mission did.
Fourth, defendants argue that, if we overrule the trial
court and remand this case for hearing on the merits, they will
be substantially prejudiced because many of their witnesses
have either forgotten the events surrounding the controversy or
have become unavailable in the nine years this case has been
pending. To rebut Mazfield's assertion that he will be
prejudiced by loss of his property interest without having had
his day in court, defendants point out that Mazfield's property
interest is already assigned to a corporation in which he
claims to have no interest. We do not find these assertions to
be unreasonable.
Fifth, while we recognize that injustice could result from
dismissal of this case, in that Mazfield will lose whatever
interest he may have in the disputed property without having
the opportunity to argue his case on its merits, we conclude
that he had more than ample opportunity to prove his asserted
interest and simply failed to do so. Such nonaction is
inezcusable, not only from the standpoint of the parties, but
also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process.
In Mazfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1975),
the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court justifiably
dismissed the plaintiff's case because she had been dilatory in
responding to the defendant's efforts at discovery, had
resisted attempts made by the defendant to get the case to
trial, was not ready to proceed at the time of the trial date

«
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because of inexcusable neglect, and had no justification for
continuance as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b). 2 We find
that the present case is factually comparable to Maxfield v.
Fishier and other cases which have been dismissed for failure
to prosecute. Sfifi e.g., Thompson Ditch Co.. 508 P.2d at 528.
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment in dismissing
Maxfield's action.
this issue isAispositive of the case, we decline
axfield"s retraining issues. Costs on appeal to

Jtegnal W. Garff, Judg,

I CONCUR

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

2.

Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) provides that,
[u]pon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may
be just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone
a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the
ground of the absence of evidence, such
motion shall also set forth the
materiality of the evidence expected to be
obtained and shall show that due diligence
has been used to procure it. The court
may also require the party seeking the
continuance to state, upon affidavit or
under oath the evidence he expects to
obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon
admits that such evidence would be given,
and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and
excluded as improper, the trial shall not
be postponed upon that ground.

7

ORME, Judge (concurring specially):
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute is usually
not appropriate except when it follows a substantial period of
complete inactivity. It would be an extraordinary case where
such a dismissal would be appropriate with trial scheduled in
just a few days, especially following a flurry of motion
activity. While the question is a closer one for me than the
main opinion may suggest, I am persuaded this is that
extraordinary case.
In my view, what saves the dismissal in this case from
crossing into the realm of abused discretion is this:
Maxfield's latest counsel's motion for leave to withdraw
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another amended
complaint constituted, taken together, a concession by Maxfield
that he was nowhere near being ready to try his case in a
matter of a few days even though the action had been pending
for the better part of a decade. It is the length of time this
action had been pending coupled with Maxfield's obvious
unreadiness that make sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this
case. I reiterate, however, that in the ordinary case where a
trial date is set, potentially dispositive motions have been
denied at a recent pretrial, and all parties are represented by
counsel, however reluctant such representation might be, the
appropriate course for the court is simply to try the case,
even though earlier periods of inaction may exist.
I also wish to comment on two aspects of the main
opinion's analysis of the parties' comparative culpability in
connection with the delays which plagued this case. First, the
opinion says that "Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case
while the Rushtons served their eighteen month mission" and
seems to imply that the Rushtons were likewise relieved of
their duty to move the case along during that period. However,
voluntary absence from the jurisdiction does not insulate a
party from litigation nor is it a legitimate justification for
avoiding one's own litigation obligations. This is so even
where the reasons for the absence are well-intentioned, such as
with the Rushtons' religious mission in this case.
Second, the main opinion seems to blame Maxfield for a
delay of nearly two years following his bankruptcy filing and
to suggest that Rushtons were excused from pursuing their
counterclaims during that time. But from all that appears,
Maxfield's bankruptcy petition was legitimate under federal law
and I do not see how we can fault him for taking advantage of

his rights under this federal scheme. That being the case, 11
U.S.C. § 362 stayed the Rushtons and the state from pursuing
their claims against him. Of course, this "automatic stay"
protects the debtor from the prosecution of actions against
him, but does not, of itself, excuse him from proceeding with
his. actions pending against others. Nonetheless, the debtor's
claims pending against others become the property of the
bankruptcy estate and where the bankruptcy is one where a
trustee is appointed, the trustee succeeds the debtor as real
party in interest relative to those claims. The trustee enjoys
the authority to administer the claims, i.e., pursue them,
settle them, or abandon them as the trustee may deem
appropriate. Thus, Maxfield may not be responsible for the
inactivity in the instant action which followed his bankruptcy
filing. Even if he is, the delay may be entirely legitimate
depending on the objectives and status of the bankruptcy cases
and the ongoing progress of liquidation or reorganization.
Conversely, one who has an action pending against a party
who files a bankruptcy petition—as with the Rushtons and their
counterclaim against Maxfield—is not altogether helpless in
the face of the bankruptcy filing. With leave of the
bankruptcy court, as ultimately was obtained here, the claim
can be pursued in state court at least to the point of
liquidating the claim or, with consent of the non-bankruptcy
party, can be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Depending
on the particular case, waiting two years to request relief
from the stay may or may not be consistent with appropriate
diligence on the part of Rushton and the state.
In short, lengthy delays in state court litigation, for
which "bankruptcy* is offered up as the major excuse, should be
carefully scrutinized. Bankruptcy is simply not the hinderance
to the timely resolution of disputes pending in state court
which many would have state court judges believe.
The parties to the main action in this case sparred and
postured for some seven years, showing little inclination to
get their claims resolved on the merits. The system had been
burdened long enough. Dismissal for failure to timely
prosecute was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.

Gregory l^brme, Judge

Rule 41

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924).
Trial courts have substantial discretion in
deciding whether to grant continuances.
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1988).
—Inability of counsel to attend trial.
The inability of counsel to be present at the
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle
his client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Unavoidable absence.
When counsel has made timely objections,
given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for
good cause, it would be an abuse of discretion
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
—New theory of case.
Continuance could be obtained to develop a
theory of the case suggested after issue joined
and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah
393 (1877).
—Procedural delays.
Court properly denied motion for continuance in action based on credit card obligation
which had been procedurally delayed for two
and a half years by interrogatories and by various motions of the defendant; and although
trial date had been set for four months, motion
for continuance was not filed until nine days
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975).

—Supporting affidavits.
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).
—Unavailable witness.
'

Lack of diligence.
Where subpoena for absent witness was not
placed in hands of an officer for service until
the morning the case was called for trial,
though it had been set for several weeks, and
the witness had testified at a former trial, continuance was denied. Corporation of Members
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Watson, 30 Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906).
In malpractice action, motion for continuance based on plaintiffs inability to serve
subpoena on vacationing medical witness was
properly denied, where plaintiff had made no
effort to depose witness and had never contacted witness for the purpose of testifying.
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah
1975).
Need.
Where the defendant's counsel had three
Weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the
witnesses, purportedly important to his case,
were actually present at trial and thus subject
to cross-examination, the purely speculative
heed for a third witness did not entitle the defendant to the granting of a motion for continuance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109
(Utah 1985).
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927
(Utah 1^78).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance
1 to 26,43 to 53; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 25,
26.
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.;
88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35.
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent continuance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-

ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
Upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.
Key Numbers. — Continuance «=» 1 et seq.;
Trial •» 1 to 7.

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
108
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Rule 41

court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court- Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent a b d i c a t i o n by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at
the triad or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 41, F.R.C.P.
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Rule 42

RULES OF THE UTAii SUPREME COURT

TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case.
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435)
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE 6 VINCENT
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S
GREAT GAME PRESERVE,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT

vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON,
et al,
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON,
Third Party
Plaintiffs,
C i v i l No. C80-8167

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party
Plaintiff,

Judge:

David Young

vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third Party Defendant.

_ i _

awPNnTY P

Tsan-p i

This matter came on for pre-trial conference on Monday,
August 31, 1987, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. by order of the court.
Personal appearances were entered by the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield;
plaintiff's counsel, Charles C. Brown and Jeffrey B. Brown;
defendants Rushtons9 counsel, Henry S. Nygaard; and counsel for
State of Utah, namely:
Leonard McGee.

Steven Schwendiman, Bernard Tanner and

The plaintiff, Reed Maxfield, and his legal

counsel argued that the issues of the Second Amended Complaint
included those set forth in plaintiffs proposed Third Amended
Complaint, a 1983 civil rights cause of action, and that Steven
Schwendiman be designated as a John Doe defendant.

Plaintiff's

counsel moved that they be allowed to withdraw upon the grounds
that plaintiff has not consummated a fee agreement with counsel;
counsel for the defendants Rushton and the State of Utah argued
that all relevant Issues were set forth in plaintiff1s Second
Amended Complaint and the defendants1 responsive pleadings including their Answers, Crossclaims, and Counterclaims.
The court, after reviewing the pleadings and exhibits on
file, having heard arguments from the plaintiff personally, and
counsel for all the parties, and being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff1s causes of action be dismissed for fail-

ure to timely prosecute.

-2-
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2.

Rights of redemption shall commence to run upon exe-

cution of this Judgment.
3.

Defendants are awarded costs.

DATED this

3^

day of

<

feo£+ZJU%

1987.

BY THE COURT:

(f J9^

dfird hf*++l

Judge Btevid Young

?

tr

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BROWN, SMITH 6 HANNA

By:
Charles C. Brown
Counsel for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

Bel
Assistant Attornfe$~General
Counsel for State of Utah

-3-
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OCT 05 1987
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435)
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

Office of ATTORNEY GENERAL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S
GREAT GAME PRESERVE,
Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
VS.

OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON,
et al,
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON,
Third Party
Plaintiffs,
Civil NO. C80-8167
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party
Plaintiff,
Judge:
vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third Party Defendant.

-l-

David Young

TO ALL PARTIES:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Judgment Was entered in
favor the defendants on the 30th day of September, 1987, by the
Honorable David Young.
DATED this

A copy of the Judgment is attached.
^

day of October, 1987.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

By:

efeS

Henry S.yNygaard
Attorney for Defendants Owen A.
Rushton and Carol Rushton
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) SS:
)

MARGARET A. NELSON, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard,
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendants Owen A. and Carol
Rushton herein; that she served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT upon:
Bernard Tanner, Esq.
Asst. Attorney General
130 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 64114
Mr. Reed Maxfield
410 East 7620 South
Midvale, UT 84047
Charles C. Brown, Esq.
Jeffrey B. Brown, Esq.
Brown, Smith & Hanna
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and
depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
^ne
'•3-' ^ a v °f October, 1987.

^

•

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
October, 1987.

*u*0^7ltL'xZfK^
day of

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

APPENDIX F, PAGE 3.

